Endovior at [unixtime wrote:1181524408[/unixtime]]For that matter, aren't Marxists also pragmatists?
Actually no. When I put down "Realists" I actually meant "Materialists" - in the hair splitting world of Philosophy, the Realists actually are in between Materialism and Rationalism - believing as Kant does that abstract concepts really exist. I'll fix it in the complete draft.
But the Pramatists believe that the difference between "is" and "should" is illusuory, while Materialists like Marx believe that ideas are at best approximations of the world (and self proclaimed materialists like Ayn Rand believe that ideas either correspond to the world exactly and are good or don't and are bad).
Utilitarian Morality is not the same as utilitarian epistemology, which is the radical notion that Pragmatists put forward. Communists frequently subscribe to the one and rarely subscribe to the other.
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So for example, Leo Strauss might agree with the statement that if something is good, then it is true (to the extent that you should teach it to others as truth). Meanwhile, Marx would say that there are many things that are true that are bad, and that it is your response to those problems that determines your worth. These are very different.
The word "pragmatic" in the lower case sense of the term doesn't really encapsulate what it means to be "Pragmatic" in the philosophical sense. Similarly with "rational" and "Rational".
-Username17
Edit:
Here's a good description of the difference:
The true and sincere opponent of pragmatism - the openly avowed opponent - is materialism, and dialectical materialism in particular. The fundamental conception of pragmatism shows an extremely close affinity with the conception of Ernst Mach, the Austrian philosopher and naturalist, and with Avenarius: the so-called school of empirio-criticism. That we have not done pragmatism an injustice by calling it idealistic, is supported by the testimony of the Encyclopedia Britannica, that great dictionary of the Anglo-Saxon world, which says, in the article on William James, that he defends the idealistic position from the empirical point of view. And the French historian of pragmatism, F. Leroux, characterizes pragmatism as an empirical or experiential idealism.
I should like to cite one more fundamental concept of pragmatism. This is the fundamental concept of a "pluralistic universe. It assumes that the world consists of component worlds which have no connection with each other. I need not labor the point that this concept is a nonsensical self-contradiction. To be sure, it is not self-contradictory to postulate a world which is at the same time a unity and a plurality, but to affirm a world, a universe, which is a plurality without unity is plainly a meaningless contradiction. If one asks oneself how a school of philosophy can achieve such palpable nonsense, one does not have to seek far for the answer: the prototype of the world which consists of parts having nothing to do with each other is the world of the high priests of all schools, a world composed of the earthly vale of tears and the heavenly hereafter which are utterly and absolutely separate and different from each other. The "pluralistic universe" is merely a new "higher" label for this ancient and insipid clerical nonsense. A further characteristic of pragmatism is its concept of truth. For pragmatism there is no objective measure of truth. Since it recognizes no reality external to the human mind, it can have no touchstone for truth. According to pragmatism truth is what "works," what is useful. The measure is thus subjective. The undefined subject who is the measure of truth is not man in general but the bourgeois in particular and his particular ends. The bourgeois mind governed by bourgeois interests is made the supreme judge of truth. That this is very convenient for the bourgeoisie certainly cannot be disputed.
The purpose of all these maneuvers of pragmatism is the "scientific" salvation and vindication of the old religious nonsense. William James himself wrote a sizeable book on The Will to Believe and another on religion experience in which he tries to prove that every form of belief, no matter how insane, contains some element of truth as long as it gives man a certain amount of power and effectiveness. For William James the Christian religion in which he was reared, is such an "effective" truth. For the African Negro it may be a wooden idol studded with nails. The whole trick lies in calling something "experience" that used to be known as belief or fantasy. William James, for example, says that the visible world is a part of a more spiritual universe from which it derives its meaning - a statement that immediately reminds one of belief in ghosts. What William James passes off as religious truth or experience is a conglomeration of the creeds of the hundred or more Christian and non-Christian sects existing in America. It is the laboratory in which the fantastic products of various religions and sects are standardized into a normal or average bourgeois faith. If some sect began to believe that the moon was green cheese and if this belief gave them strength, then pragmatism would mix this ingredient into the general religious brew.